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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 4, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 81-469
Cert to CAS (Godbold, Simpson,
Roney)

BUSH (discharged
government employee)

v.
LUCAS (supervisor)

Federal/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY: The issue is whether petr, a government employee,
can maintain a "Bivens-type" action against his former supervisor
based on the supervisor's alleged conspiracy to demote petr in
violation of his First Amendment rights.
FACTS: Petr Bush is an aerospace engineer who was for
several years a civil service employee at NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala.

In May and June 1975, Bush

appeared twice on Huntsville television station WHNT and, in the
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course of interviews, stated that his position at the Flight
Center was "a falsehood, travesty and worthless" and that he had
meaningful work to do only a small percentage of each day.
Bush's comments were disseminated nationally by the wire services
and appeared in newspapers in several states.
On

June 25, 1975, resp Lucas, then Director of the Flight

Center, presided at a press conference in commemoration of the
Center's 15th anniversary.

After the conference was officially

closed, a WHNT reporter asked Lucas to respond to Bush's charges.
Lucas replied that
"I have had [Bush's] statement investigated and I can say
unequivocally that such a statement has no basis in fact."
In August 1975, an "adverse personnel action" was instituted
to remove Bush from his position.

Following a hearing, Lucas

notified Bush that he would not be removed but that he was being
reduced in grade from GS-14 to GS-12.

Bush appealed to the Civil

Service Commission, which upheld the reduction in grade.
However, in July 1978 the Commission's Appeals Review Board
recommended that Bush be reinstated to his former grade and
awarded $30,724 in back pay; NASA complied with the
recommendation.
Meanwhile, Bush had instituted this suit in state court
alleging that Lucas' statement (quoted above) defamed him and
that Lucas had conspired to demote him in violation of his First
Amendment rights.

The suit was removed to the N.D. Ala.

(Pointer) and, in Feb. 1977, the DC granted Lucas' motion for
summary judgment.

The DC concluded first that Lucas was

absolutely immune from a defamation suit based on statements made
in his official capacity, see Barr v. Mateo, 360

u.s.

564 (1959)-

- 3 -

-a holding which is not challenged here.

The DC then held that

Bush could not maintain an action for damages against Lucas under
the First Amendment, because Congress had provided civil service
employees such as Bush an alternative administrative remedy for
wrongful demotion.
On

appeal, the CAS affirmed, relying on the then-recent

decision in Davis v. Passman, 442

u.s.

228 (1979).

However, this

Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).

446

u.s.

914 (1980).

HOLDING BELOW: On remand, the same CAS panel reaffirmed the
DC's grant of summary judgment.

Carlson held that the victim of

a constitutional violation by a federal agent has a right to
recover damages in a suit against the agent brought directly
under the Constitution, except when the defendant 1)
"demonstrate[s] 'special factors counselling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress'"; or 2) "show[s] that
Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective."
19.

446 U.S., at 18-

The CA did not reach the question whether Congress had

provided a substitute remedy, since it found that "the unique
relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service
employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in
inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of affirmative
congressional action."
The CA first pointed to several cases illustrating that
"[t] he role of the Government as an employer toward its employees
is fundamentally different from its role as sovereign over
private citizens generally."

E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 41S U.S.
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61, 83 (1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
(1968).

u.s.

563

This special relationship affects not only the

substantive rights of public employees but also the manner in
which an aggrieved employee can seek redress for violations of
those rights.

Through comprehensive legislation and

administrative regulation, Congress has sought to "achieve a
proper balance between promoting governmental efficiency and
protecting the rights of employees aggrieved by improper
personnel action."

It has thus provided for extensive

administrative review of employee grievances--procedures which
petr used with success in this case.

This case is thus

distinguishable from Bivens and Carlson, in which private
citizens sought damages against agents of the government acting
in its sovereign capacity.

Since inferring a "Bivens remedy" in

this case might encourage employees to bypass their
congressionally-provided administrative remedies in favor of
judicial relief, there are "special factors" counselling against
recognition of a constitutionally-based damages action.

See

Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (CAS 1980).
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this Court should grant cert
to settle the important question whether "a plaintiff's mere
status as a civilian employee of the United States precludes his
being accorded a Bivens-type remedy."

This issue affects the 3

million civilian employees of the federal government.

(Three

unions representing government employees have filed amicus briefs
in support of the petn.)
Petr also argues that the decision below and Bishop v. Tice,
supra, conflict with Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (CA7 1981),
which held that a federal employee could maintain a damages
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action based on her allegations of coerced retirement.

Indeed,

the Justice Dept. sought a rehearing in Sonntag by arguing that
it "conflicts directly" with Bishop and this case.

Finally, the

CAS decision is inconsistent with Carlson.
The SG responds that the CA correctly determined that the
special nature of the federal government's relationship with its
own civil service employees counsels against implication of a
Bivens remedy here.

Accord Bishop v. Tice, supra; Purtill v.

Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 137-38 (CA3 1981).

The CA could also have

determined that Congress intended its comprehensive civil service
protections to provide an "equally effective substitute remedy"
precluding suits by employees against their supervisors brought
directly under the Constitution.

Finally, the decision below

does not seriously conflict with Sonntag, since that decision was
predicated on the court's (erroneous) belief that the plaintiff's
"coerced retirement" claim was irremediable under the civil
service laws and that therefore she had no alternative remedy
available.
DISCUSSION:

For the reasons given by the SG, there is not a

significant conflict with Sonntag.

Furthermore, this case is not

a particularly good vehicle for consideration of the issue
presented--concededly an important one which the Court may
eventually want, or be compelled by a direct conflict, to
address.

Petr has already obtained reinstatement and back pay

pursuant the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission's
Appeals Board.

Thus, even if the case is not technically moot

(petr makes a vague reference to his "wrongs" not being "full':)
redressed," and amici refer to punitive damages), it is not
readily apparent whether anything of importance would hinge on

-

the Court's decision.

6 -

Finally, the CA precedent in the area is

of recent vintage; it probably would be worthwhile to let that
precedent develop further before taking the issue.
However, although neither party mentions the fact, the issue
in this case is also present in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No. 79-1738
and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No. 80-945, to be argued 11/30/81.
There, a civil service employee (Fitzgerald) was discharged,
allegedly in retaliation for his testimony before a congressional
committee; like Bush, Fitzgerald was reinstated and granted backpay by the Civil Service Commission.

The primary issue in the

Fitzgerald cases is the scope of official immunity of a President
and his advisors; but petrs Harlow and Butterfield, relying in

:::::::..

part on the CAS decision in this case, argue both that "Bivenstype" actions may not be maintained for First Amendment
violations and that no constitutionally-based damages remedy
should be inferred in light of the administrative remedies
available to Fitzgerald.
25.

See Petrs' Brief in No. 80-945, at 21-

While these issues are not among the "questions presented"

in the cert petn (petrs did mention them at 14 n.9 of the cert
petn in 80-945), it is possible that the Court will discuss them
in the Fitzgerald opinion.

It might therefore be appropriate to

hold this case for the Fitzgerald cases.

Alternatively, I

recommend denial.
There is a response.

November 25, 1981
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June 23, 1982

Memorandum to the Conference
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald

No ~ Bush

v. Lucas

In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program.
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay
from the Civil Service Commission. - In the meantllme,
however, he had i~tituted this dama~es action against
r~ondent, his admlnistrative super1or.
The suit alleged a
conspfracy to aeprive petitioner of First Amendment rights.
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an
al.ternati._y_e remeqy under the ~ivil Service 1\ct. Tliis Court
then vacated and remandea for reconsioeration in light of
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship ]
between the Federal Government and its civil service
~
employees is a special consideration which counsels
C s-hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of
~- .
affirmative congressional act1on.• The panel also noted
/~
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to
lA~ bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in
·(
/ favor of judicial relief.
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government
employee represented a •special factor• defeating his claim
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member
maJority 1n that case relies on a cumulation of factors not
all present here.
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STICE: LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

June 23, 1982

Memorandum to the Conference
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald

No ~ Bush

v. Lucas

In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program.
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay
from the Civil Service Commission. - In t he meant:Lme,
however, he had i~tituted this dama ~ es action against
reseo~den~, his adml n i strative super1or.
The suit alleged a
consp1rac to a epr i ve petitioner of First Amendment rights.
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an
a~ternati~e reme qy under the ~ ivi l Serv f ce ~c t .
Th is Court
then vacated and remanded for reconsioerat i on in light of
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship s
between the Federal Government and its civil service
~
employees is a special consideration which counsels
C s-hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of
~- .
affirmative congressional act1on.• The panel also noted
~~
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to
tA~ bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in
·(
/ favor of judicial relief.
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government
employee represented a •special factor• defeating his claim
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member
maJority 1n that case relies on a cumulation of factors not
all present here.
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The question raised is an important one. Moreover, the
CAS deicision in this case is in conflict with the decision
of CA7 in Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 {1981).
I will vote to GRANT.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-469
Bush v. Lucas
January 19, 1983

Jim

I.
1.

Questions Presented

Does pltf's status as a civilian employee of the federal

government preclude a Bivens suit against another federal civilian
employee personally for deft's violation of pltf's 1st or 5th A
rights in the course of deft's procuring of pltf's demotion?
2.

Does administrative relief with respect to such demotion

preempt a Bivens suit by the demoted federal civilian employee
against the individual person who, while purporting to act in his
official executive position with the federal government, allegedly
conspired with others to procure the demotion in retaliation for the
pltf's public comments upon personnel and management practices at
the governmental facility where both parties were employed?

2.

II.
A.

Background

Facts
Petr is an employee of NASA at the Marshall Space Flight

Center.

The Center's management assigned petr to a new position.

Petr voiced objections to the assignment, stating that the position
lacked any duties of consequence.

He appealed the reassignment to

the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and, during the pendency of the
appeal, spoke out concerning the lack of productive work in the new
position and the apparent misuse and waste of federal funds.
After the media reported petr's views, resp, the Director of
the Center, stated during a press conference that he had ordered an
investigation of petr's statements and that they had no basis in
fact.

Less than two months later, a personnel action was initiated

against petr.

Resp, charged with decisionmaking authority in such

matters, reduced
petr
in grade
from GS-14 to GS-12.
....._
_____......_
7
~

this decision to the

Petr appealed

esc, and was ultimately restored to his former

grade and awarded back pay.
Before he received this favorable decision, petr filed suit in
state court, alleging that resp had conspired with others to demote
petr in retaliation for the exercise of his lst A rights.
removed the case to DC and moved for SJ.
and the CA affirmed.

The DC granted the motion

Petr then filed a petn for cert, which the

Court GVRed in light of Carlson v. Green, 446
B.

Resp

u.s.

14 (1980).

Decision Below
/

On remand, the CAS again affirmed the DC's decision. The court
~
stated that it would not confer on petr a damages remedy implied
directly under the Constitution if there were "special factors

!

f

I

3.

counselling hesitation" in finding such a remedy, and it ruled that
such factors are present here.

Specifically, the CAS found "the

unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil
service employees" to be such a special
factor •
...::....--III.
A.

Summary of the Parties' Contentions

Petr
The status of a Bivens plaintiff as a civilian employee of the

federal government is not sufficient to constitute a "special factor
counseling hesitation" in the according of the Bivens remedy to such
plaintiff.

Rather, the interest of the Government as employer is

one of several interests to be balanced in determining which of
several interests is to be prevail.

Petr's status as an employee of

the Government does not deprive him altogether of his rights to
express himself publicly on matters of public concern or to petn the
Government for redress of grievances.
Congress's creation of a civil service system, although

-----------------------------------certainly attended
by efforts to preserve some balance between the
rights of governmental employees as citizens and the interest of the
Government as employer, does not evidence incompatibility between
the maintenance of the efficient public service and the vindication
of the employees' 1st A rights by a Bivens suit.

Administrative

relief is not sufficiently comprehensive or focused to warrant an
inference that Congress meant for the statutes and regulations to be
the exclusive remedy for a civilian employee who had suffered a
retaliatory deomotion in reprisal for his having exercised his 1st A
rights.

Moreover, such an inference, even had it been warranted,

4.

would not have constituted an explicit congressional declaration
that the statutes were to be a substitute for a Bivens suit.
B.

SG

In Bivens, the Court held that a plaintiff who alleges that his
constitutional rights have been violated may sue the responsible
federal officials for damages, even though Congress has not
explicitly established such a remedy.

In each case in which the

Court has allowed a Bivens action, however, it has ensured that it
was not acting in a fashion inconsistent with Congress's intent.

In

particular, the Court has allowed a Bivens action only after
concluding either that Congress has not addressed the question how
to remedy a particular category of constitutional violations, or
that Congress has resolved that question in a way that presupposes a
judicially created damages remedy.
In this respect, Bivens and its progeny are faithful to the
principle--wel r ,established in other areas where federal courts have

-

acted in the absence of explicit congressional authority--that, when
Congress addresses a remedial problem in a way that reflects its
intention to occupy the field, that intention must be honored.

1Bivens

recognized this principle by stating that an alternative

remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress, precludes an
implied personal damages action.

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

u.s.

388, 397 (1971).

Moreover, Bivens expressly acknowledged that in some contexts--where
there are "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress"--a court should not afford a

5.

traditional judicial remedy even if Congress has not specifically
addressed the remedial problem.
The civil service remedies that were available to petr, and
that he successfully invoked, not only were fully adequate to
redress a constitutional violation, but reflected Congress's intent
to occupy the field in a way that precludes a judicially created
Bivens remedy.

Moreover, special factors arising from the federal

employment relationship require, at a minimum, that any doubts be
resolved in favor of the preclusive effect of the civil service
remedies.
IV.

~

A.

DISCUSSION
Case Law

In Carlson, the Court summarized the principles that govern the
availability of a damages remedy in federal court against a federal
official when a violation of constitutional rights is alleged:

? ~~
~
~.

. t!
~

Bivens established that the victims of a
constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right
to recover damages against the official in federal court
depite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.
Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular
case, however, in two situations. The Lirst is when
defendants demonstrate "special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." 403 U.S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 245 (1979). The ~ecojld is when defendants show that
Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitut1on and v1ewed as equally
effective. Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis v. Passman,
supra, at 245-247.
446 U.S., at 18-19.

JUSTICE POWELL concurred in the judgment,

finding that "[t]he foregoing statement contains dicta that go well
beyond the prior holdings of this Court."

Id., at 26.

He indicated

that federal courts have much more "discretion" in determining

~~

6.

whether a remedy should be inferred from the Constitution than the
majority in Carlson allowed.

Id., at 28-29.

In Davis, JUSTICE POWELL dissented, stating "that federal
courts must exercise a principled discretion when called upon to
infer a private cause of action directly from the language of the
Constitution."

442 U.S., at 252.

He emphasized that one of the

"policies that a court certainly should consider in deciding whether
to imply a constitutional right of action is that of comity toward
an equal and coordinate branch of government."

Id., at 253.

Any

less consideration and balancing, he said, "avoids our obligation to
take into account the range of policy and constitutional
considerations that we would expect a legislature to ponder in
determining whether a particular remedy should be enacted."

Id., at

255.
B.

"Special Factors"
It seems clear that the traditional remedy of damages for

constitutional violations is not to be defeated simply because there
is a countervailing government interest.

The Court has apparently

reserved "special factors" for extraordinary cases, where the mere
threat of litigation and personal accountability would impinge upon
the constitutional prerogatives of officials in coordinate branches
of government.
\I

I •

The actual examples of "special factors," however, are few.
Bivens opinion discussed only two circumstances, both very
unique: (i} cases involving "federal fiscal policy," where the U.S.
was a plaintiff, such as United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301
(1947}; and (ii} cases involving liability of a congressional

l

l

7.

employee for nonconstitutional claims, such as Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647 (1963).

See Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396-397.

A third

"special factor counseling hestitation" was recognized in Davis,
where this Court stated that employment discrimination by a
Congressman raised "special concerns counselling hestitation"
because of deft's status as a Congressman.

442

u.s.,

at 246.

Such

concerns were nevertheless held not to preclude a Bivens remedy
because they were accommodated by the coextensive protections of the
Speech or Debate Clause.
Davis did not concern the Government in its role as a sovereign
over private citizens generally, but the role of the Government as
an employer toward its employees.

Yet the Court saw nothing about

the employment relationship as such to suggest that courts should
withhold a cause of action in damages.

In Carlson, the Court

determined that a pltf's prisoner status does not preclude a Bivens
claim, indicating that the Court had no intention of authorizing a
freewheeling inquiry into whether pltf's relationship to the
Government is a "special factor counselling hesitation."

Moreover,

the Court expressly held that, even where the defense of a Bivens
action would inhibit the performance of official duties by deft
officers, this is not a "special factor" sufficient to preclude a
Bivens remedy.

-

See 446

u.s.,

at 19.

Davis hardly suggests a cautious judicial approac g here.

If

anything, the relationship between a member of Congress and his
small staff is likely to be considerably more intimate than that
which exists between the chief policy makers and lower level

8.

employees in the executive branch.

Few employers enjoy more

discretion than congressional members.
The CAS focused on three factors that indicated the federal
employer/employee relationship was not to be policed by Bivens

actions ~ivil
oversight

service

~ontrol

remedies~he

high _degree of congressional

that characterizes the employer-employee

relationship in federal service, and

t~ircumscribed

governmental employees' grievance rights.

nature of

These are not, however,

of the same importance or character as the factors recognized as
special in prior Court opinions.

First, the difficulty with

remedies as a special factor is that it reviews congressional
enactments under an inappropriate portion of the Carlson test,
rendering superfluous one branch of the test.

Second, it would be

anomalous to subject members of Congress to potential liability
under Bivens arising out of an employment relationship, and almost
employers under §1983, but exempt all federal supervisory
~~ ... ~loyees

~~

in the Executive branch simply because they are federal

l employees. See Carlson, 446

u.s.,

at 22 ("' [T]he constitutional

design' would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face

~-

at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same

~

constitutional transgression."); Butz v. Economou, 438

u.s.,

at 501

("Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of
protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do
state officers.")

(emphasis in original).

And finally, the Court's

decisions, in a wide variety of settings, make clear that 1st A
rights are subject to balancing of interests, and the balancing
analysis used in employee cases such as Pickering is no different in

}

9

0

principle from that called for by the Court in other 1st A cases.
Thus, the fact that the speech of federal emloyees is subject to a
weighing of competing interests does not seem particularly
"special."
I find it difficult to conclude that the federal
employee/employer relationship, standing alone, should constitute a
"special factor," as the Court used that phrase in Carlson.
C.

Alternative Remedies
The Government argues that there is a statutory scheme that

fulfills the second part of the Carlson test and preempts the Bivens
action that would otherwise be available to petr.

The scheme is

said to emerge from various provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act,
as amended and the Back Pay Act of 1966.

The Government finds

additional support for its position in the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978.
The CAS did not rely expressly on this portion of the Carlson
test, but I find it difficult to conclude that the Government has
carried its Carlson burden of demonstrating that Congress "provided
an alternative remedy which is expliitly declared to be a substitute
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective."

J ~.n~remedial

~~

446 U.S., at 18-19 (emphasis in original).

The

scheme on which the Government relies is much different

0

from a Bivens action: the statutes do not provide for compensatory

~f or
--

d amages ot h er t h an b ac k pay,

trial.

. .
d
($Jf
.
pun1t1ve
amages, or
or Jury

Most important, the Carlson standard requires a subjective

determination of congressional intent, and there is nothing in the
pre-Bivens statutes to show that Congress meant to preempt a Bivens

10.

remedy or create an equally effective remedy for constitutional
violations.
D.

Difficulties with a Bivens Action
Despite my inability to conclude that the Carlson standard

precludes a cause of action in this case, I have trouble believing

\

~,

that such an action is desirable, largely for the reasons stated by
the SG in his brief.

Even if the federal relationship is not a

special factor consistent with the few precendents in this area, it
remains "special" in many ways.
168

(1974) ~ inion

u.s.

In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416

134,

of POWELL, J.), you emphasized that, "to perform

its resposibilities effectively and economically, .•• the
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control
over the management of its personnel and internal affairs."

It is

naive to suggest that an implied cause of action running against an
agency head's personal assets will not influence how some executive
officers conduct government business.

Because Government business

is a concern of all citizens, the Government interest here is
somewhat special.
It is impossible to overlook the incredibly comprehensive--and
employee-protective--remedial civil service scheme, the existence
alone of which counsels strongly for not giving petr another remedy.
Under 5

u.s.c.

§7513(a), petr could be demoted "only for such cause

as will promote the efficiency of [the civil] service."

This

standard prohibits adverse actions that violate the 1st A.
Arnett, 416 U.S., at 162 {opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST).

See
It is very

difficult for resp to argue that federal workers need much more

I!

11.

protection or that their supervisors need to be deterred further,
regardless of the wrong.
It should not be lost sight that what the Court has before it
is simply federal common law, and the fact that the implied cause of
action at issue here is for a constitutional harm is irrelevant.
The Court's trend of not implying remedies with statutory violations
is inconsistent with its approach in Carlson of providing many
implied Bivens actions for any constitutional violation.

The Court

has undercut the sweep of .carlson greatly by importing immunities
from other areas, but the bottom line has to be that, as far as
judicially created remedies are concerned, "there is not a damages
remedy for every legal wrong."
2704 n. 37 {1982)

{POWELL, J.).

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690,
If ever there were pltfs or wrongs

that do not need a damages remedy, this would seem to be the case.
The Court may have suggested as much in Nixon when it took notice
that "it was clear at least that Fitgerald was entitled to seek a
remedy before the Civil Service Commission--a remedy of which he
availed himself."

Id., at 2705 n. 37.

See also Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2740 n.36 {1982) {quoting and citing
this case, and viewing question presented here as not
"insubstantial").

--

Assuming, as we must, that Bivens will remain the law, a more
appropriate test than that of Carlson for determining when a Bivens

-

action will be implied is, as a threshold question, whether an

-

' i mplied cause of action~ is inconsistent with congressional intent as
expressed elsewhere--here by the remedial scheme that Congress did
------------~

provide.

This standard would be more consistent with the other

12.

implied-right-of-action cases.
difficult.

Here, the answer is not too

Congress has specifically addressed the question what

remedy to afford a civil servant who complains of an unlawful
personnel action.

Congress has established an elaborate and

integrated remedial scheme, consisting of multiple levels of
administrative consideration followed by judicial review.

These

remedies are designed to provide adequate compensation to any
federal employee who is the victim of an unconstitutional personnel
action.

By providing for judicial reciew and such compensatory

relief, these civil service remedies exceed any minimum requirements
of adequacy derived from the Constitution itself.
V.

Summary

It is difficult after Carlson to say that current standards do
not give petr a private right of action for damages.

But I find

nothing in the policies behind creating implied causes of action
that supports finding one here.

I think the restrictive Carlson

standard should be modified to parallel more closely the Court's
standard with regard to implied causes of action in other contexts,
with an emphasis on congressional intent.

The fact that a Bivens

remedy involves constitutional rights does not alter the basic
nature of the inquiry, which is whether allowing that remedy
consistent with Congress's intent.

~s

Of course, the inquiry into

congressional intent necessarily takes into account every relevant
factor, see Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 825 {1976)--including the
importance of the rights involved--but the question whether the
courts should create a particular remedy should turn on whether
Congress intended to occupy the field.

I recommend affirming.

l~

81-469 BUSH v. LUCAS

Argued 1/19/83

~-- ~Gj
Jl.e-~~C~v~
~~~~-- ~

l~L\

~~~?~--~~

~~~~

~~~M~~~

(;'

No.

81-469

The Chief Justice

Bush v. Lucas

Conf. 1/21/83

~~

~
~;>.u ~-

c.........:.t

~

~~

Jl/~1-

4-

~ ~ e.-1---~"

~

~~~~~J.D~
~~ ~?-<-<)~~~

Justice Brennan

~~

~A> ,jiF~f{..~-~ ~ ~~ ~~.....

~~,

wp.,s

~~ ~

~~~~~~c>f
~~~~-----r

Justice White

atf ~
~~~~~

Justice Marshall ~ ~

~~~~~,,

Justice Blackmun

2lff. ~

$~ ~~a~-<-~~~~"""-"C.4

~.
/~.1-L ~ ~ ca.- '-""'""-;;ii~~~~

~·

~-·:' b~~a..,~
~~C)L~

I.AA--~· ~ a-LL~~

?L/3~~
Justice Powell

Justice Marshall · ~~

~~~~~,,

Justice Blackmun

2Zff.

~

s~ f--<-~a,~~~~~~"""'.-cA

~.
/~,l-L ~~ca.- c...-,.~~~~~
~·

~ . . . . &~~a,..,~
~~9L~

~.A.A.-~· ~ a...<-L~ ~

~/3~~
Justice Powell

Ii
l

l
I

.. .

Justice Rehnquist

Justice Stevens

Justice O'Connor

~ _~
~

~

~.

62-( c;...;-rl.-1~~~.......,

.:>

~

~~

- .4.-

:::J

.!J ~ ~ )~ (-.¢'1-4~~./b.t4.~'Uruff.s;-v,Ice Blackmun
~ ...... ~ ~/.J.-.1~~ ~.

~

~~

.....-~

~~1-<;~v~

~of~-~-r·

JusticePowell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
MAY 11

·sa

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ __ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-469

WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v.
WILLIAM R. LUCAS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1983]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service
Commission. 1 In May and June 1975, while some of his administrative appeals were pending, he made a number of
public statements, including two televised interviews, that
' The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first reassignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful attempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30.

..
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worthless," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudulently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least
three other States. 2
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's inquiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and that
petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel action was initiated to remove petitioner from his position.
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Government, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and economy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Government service." He was also informed that his conduct had
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 Petitioner had
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then determined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first offense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary
by approximately $9,716.
App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District
Court); id., at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority).
' !d., at f-2 to f-3, e-19, e-7.
2
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Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority. After a three-day pubhc fieari~ upheld some of the charges and concluded
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined
that a number of petitioner's public statements were misleading and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, petitioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discrediting the agency and its employees. Third, there was no legitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petitioner's position. 4
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, petitioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen tilePfoceeding. Ti;; Board reexamined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities,
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it acknowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-today routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government,
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of expression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible
' I d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so.

f
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space
program." Because petitioner's statements, though somewhat exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and extent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that he receive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Petitioner received approximately$ 30,000 in back pay.
While his administrative a eal w
e ·
petitioner ~~
filed an action a amst res ondent in tate court n A!aOama
see ng to recover damages for defamatiOn and violation of
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit
to the United States District Court for the Northern District
-~.
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary
~4
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation claim could not
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), respondent was absolutely munune from liability for
~.
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demotion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of (_ J)
A~~
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 2d 958 (1979).
£;" - f V
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and
. ~-~ _ ~ ~I
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our interW ..t... ~
vening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). t. .LI ~.~J
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against
~~~
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plain- ~ L~ v
tiff had no cause of action for damages under the First
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available ~~~
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations." --;r:.::::...._ 647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service em-

~~

0L b/ ~

5
6

I d., at f-23 to f-25.
Id., at d-2 to d-17.

2-!
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in
this context.
Vje assu:gJ.e for purposes of decision that petitioner's First ~d./
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel
~
action. 7 W~ also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil
service rem~di~ere not as effective as an individual dam- Uv(i-:!"~
ages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm
~tk.
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed.
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a rem~
edy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive
~~~
mode of redress.
Thus, we assume, a federal right ha.§. been violated and ~~
Congress ~vided a less than complete remedy for the
Pd.;~~,,
wrong. If we were writing on a clean slate, we might answer the question whether to supplement the statutory

~

Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the District Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us.
8
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Federal Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Petitioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent individually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the
unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner
7

27-29.
9
His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. Id., at
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action
brought directly under the Constitution.

'

t
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or )
we might start from the premise that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not
e~teno beyona ffie grantin-ofre~zed by
naer t e former approac , pe 1 1oner would
Congre s.
ooviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear
that he would lose.
Our prior...,£ases, although sometimes emphasizing one approach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected
b_2.th ~· They establish ~ur power to grant rehef
tn:ifiS-not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. We
therefore first review some of the cases establishin_g __our
power fo remed violat10nSOffiieCOn8titutiOnanatl1en consider theoeanng o e ex1stmg sta utory scheme on the precise issue presented by this case.
I
The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to
In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit,
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld,
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." 3 Commentaries 23, 109.
"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
10
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured by
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. 8. 678,
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available
judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.
This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory remedies for vwlatwns of t e on · ·
an s ate
o'fficials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution
itself supports a priv
cause of action for damages against a
federal official. Biven · v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. 8.
(1971); Davis v. ~442 U. 8.
228 (1979); ~ v. Green, 446 U. 8.
80).
In Bivens tne-pfaintiff alleged that federal agents, without
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate juSee, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1900) (damages against state officer
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation of
Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933)
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969).
12

f

•
(

,J
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an obstacle to the award of damages:
"That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition.
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v.
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894);
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course,
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is . . . well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396.
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
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damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."
Id., at 397.
In his separate concurring opinion, ~an also
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in
Congress' hands. ld., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned,
the real guestion presented was not "whether the federal
coUrts have the power to afford one type of remedy as opposed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should
govern the exercise of our power." !d., at 406. In resolving that question he suggested "that the range of policy cons\_derations we may take into account is ar least as broad as
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." Id., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth
Amendment rights by federal officials.
In avts v. Passman 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner,
former eputy admm1s rative assistant to a Member of Congress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we emp as·
he fact that no other alternative form of ·udicial relief was availa le. Not only was the case one in w 1ch "it is
13

"Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1,

supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing.

And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief.

For
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damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing recovery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's
position may not recover damages from those responsible for
their in'ur . ld., at 246-247.
arlson v. Gr446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim
that a fe era prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were responsible for his death because they had violated their constitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and
Davis, the Green case was one in which Coniress had pro~d a remedy, under the :Federal."'T''rf"Craims Act, agrunst
the Unitea"'Stafes for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on
the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be defeated in two situations, but found that neither was present.
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
446 U. S., at 18--19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and Davis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congressional
determination foreclosing the damages claim and making the
Federal Tort Claims Ac\ ,exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19, and n.
5. No Ytatute expressly decl~red the FTCA r.5!~ be a
history
substitute
for a Bwens"" action;Triaeeo, tne legislative
~
.
of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made 1t crystal clear
that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action." ld., at 19-20.
Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 442 U. S., at 245.

~

-~
TtNf-~
410 ~ ~ ~

~
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This much is clearly established by our prior cases. The
federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim
of a constitutional violation. As long as it provides a s_onstitutionally adequate if not id 'ca alternative remedy,
Co~s its intent, by statutory language or
clear legis a 1ve 1s ory, that such po wer shoul<i.not be ex_ercised. l\1oreover, '6y creating an equally effective remedy,
COrigress may eliminate the need for judicial recognition of a
Bivens-type action for damages. In the absence of either of
these circumstances, the federal courts must make the kind
of remedial determination that is appropriate for a commonlaw tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special
factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind
of federal litigation.
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this
case, either by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he seeks or by providing him with an equally effective
substitute. 14 We must therefore consider whether a federal
employee's attempt to recover dama es from fiTs superior for
v1o ation o 1s irst men ment rights involves a,ny "special
factors counselling hesitation." When those wordswere
first usea in Hwens, 4Us-u. 8., at 396, w~ illustrated our
meaning by referring to United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 (1947), and United States v. Gilman,
347

u. s. 507 (1954).

In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to authorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital expenses on the Government and depriving it of his services.
14
We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for protected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See pp. - , infra.
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Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpation of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court nevertheless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the national purse" should make the necessary determination of
federal fiscal policy. 15 The Court refused to create a damages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determining and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabilities." Id., at 314.
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover indemnity from one of its employees after having been held liable under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Government employment gives rise to policy questions of great import, both to the employees and to the Executive and LegisThe decision
lative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509.
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for defer5

"Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314--315.
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages action. Id., at 315--316.
'
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ring to Congressional policy determinations were even more
compelling than in Standard Oil.
"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed,
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position.
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most
advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws,
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at
511-513.
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern
the merits of the particular remedy that was sought.
Rather, they related to th uestion of who should decide
e should ~ ~
whether such a remedy should be rov1 e .
there ore begin by consi ering whether there are reasons for ~ ~/
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is
. T" ....
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment ~
rights have been violated by their supervisors.
/'~ ... ~.J~.A.f, c/e>
II
._.~_,_.,

a~

Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Nevertheless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy"
and the relations between the Government and its employees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may appropriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel policy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a
retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised
his First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available to him?
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over

{ I

~
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the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage
system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the federal employee had no legal protection against political retaliation. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to
support a political candidate opposing the party in office
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for discharge.16 During the past century, however, the job security of federal employees has steadi13, iJtcreased.
In the Pendleton Act Congressl etlat>ed the Civil Service
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil servants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Although the statute did not address the question of removals
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service
could be required to contribute to arty political fund or fired
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempting to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18
The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment submitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, contained a vivid description
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows:
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the
business of distributing patronage among its friends. . . . [The President]
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what others before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand."
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882).
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26--173 (1976).
17
SeeS. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826,
47th Con g., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permitting removals only for cause).
18
Section 13 provided,
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or
16
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Congressional attention to the problem of politically-motivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade
federal employees to communicate directly with Congress
without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These "gag
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose."
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit political contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other government employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commission to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C.
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976).
19
In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which
provided that:
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description,
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Government establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington,
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theodore Roosevelt."
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909:
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordinate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for congressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either
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orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act in
1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided that "no
person in the classified Civil Service of the United States
shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in
writing, .... " 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed that the
right of civil servants "to furnish information to either House
of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall
not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the House Report
explained, this legislation was intended "to protect employees against oppression and in the right of free speech and the
right to consult their representatives." 23 In enacting the
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as authorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft."
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912).
20
See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder)
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id.,
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen.
LaFollette).
21
The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits.
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforceable. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203.
22
This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presentation to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of
persons from said service."
22
H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Con g., 2d Sess. 7 (1912).
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Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient management
of government operations did not preclude the extension of
free speech rights to government employees. 24
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the conflicting interests involved in providing job security, protecting the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and
efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional leg24

Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Calder); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd).
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its report that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omitted entirely:
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to
Congress or Members thereof. But governmental employees occupy a position relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens.
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their relation to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong.
2d Sess. 21 (1912).
As Sen. Bourne explained, "it was believed by the committee that to recognize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particular grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676· (1912).
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 10728-10733, 10792-10804, the committee
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subsequently enacted into law. Id., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555.

I
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25
Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extending the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to certain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966,
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shifting adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Systems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers").
~Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec.
Order No. 11491, §22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commission, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel
actions other than removal and suspension without pay.
27
See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975).
28
Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example,
there are no provisions for appeal of suspensions for 14 days or less, 5
U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), suspension and removal from positions in
certain agencies in the interests of national security, 5 U. S. C. §§ 7531,
7532 (1976), and adverse actions against probationary employees, 5
U. S. C. § 7511 (Supp. V 1981). In addition, certain actions by supervisors against federal employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches,
or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as "personnel actions"
within the statutory scheme. We need not decide whether constitutional

7
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tional challenges to agency action, such as the first Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully co~izable within
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the
Government's com. rehensive scheme is costl to administer,
but 1t provi es meaningru remedies for employees who may
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments
about their agencies. 29
A federal employee in the competitive service may be removed or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at the
time of petitioner's demotion in 1975, 31 which are substantially similar to those now in effect, required that an employee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee
then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that
damages actions based on such actions are barred.
29
Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay.
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 198-199
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested
removal were successful. I d. , at 204 n. 35.
30
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this
protection was accorded in part by st:itu€e, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (!976) (removals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees);
i d. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Service Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a) , 752.201 (1975) (adverse
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees,
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the
general rule , 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices. " § 2302.
31
Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at different times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218.
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formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a)
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral non-evidentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32
The regulations required that the final agency decision be
made by an official higher in rank than the official who proposed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial
reasons had been sustained. Ibid.; 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4)
(1976).
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the employee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agency's
witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials,
§ 772.307(c), 34 and then to render a written decision,
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judicially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court
of Claims. 35 In addition, the employee had the right to ask
32
Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C.
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983).
33
The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C.
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981).
84
The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972).
"' Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB.
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the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an adverse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310.
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period,
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803.
Congress intended that these remedies would put the employee "in the same position he would have been in had the
unjustified ~s personnel action not taken place." 36
Given th~ the development of civil service remedies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is /
ql,l_ite different ~the typical remedial issue confronte<(by
a c ommon-law court. The question is not what remedy the
cOUrt shoul(f provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. The~ JUdgmenft should be
informed by a thorough understanlrigOf the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that
would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment rights.
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are alreaay sigruficant-not only in mone9!:J terms,
but also m The time and energy of managerial persQD.nel.Jyho
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C.
§ 1295).
36
S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th. Cong. , 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
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must defend their decisions. The Government argues that
supervisory ersonnel are already more hesitant than they
shou
e m admirus ermg ISClp ine, because the review that
en'Su.es ine"'Vita61'y"makes Uie performance of their regular duties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41.
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite probable that if management personnel face the added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. fn all
events, Congress is in a far better positiOn than"' a court to
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views.
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level government employees are a valuable source of information, and
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37 Moreover, federal
37
There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated,
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better qualified to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have
complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec.
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employees are a well organized group whos
in the halls of Congress. 38
Thus, w do not decide on the merits whether a federal employee should be allowed to recover damages from a supervisor w o as improper y d1sc1p me
1m for exercising his
First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil, we decline "to create a new substantive legal liability without legislative ai an as a the common aw" 332 U. S., at 302, because we are convinced that Congress is in a better PQ.Sition
to decide whether or not the public interest would be served
b:{CFeatlng it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal employees are often the source of information about agency operations suppressed by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual working situation than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress,
spoken to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees provide much of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, budgets, and overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print
1978). See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386--387
(1978); S. Rep. No. 95-696, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
38
See, e. g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1978, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs
on S. 2640, S. 2707, S. 2830, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. iii-v (1978) (list of witnesses).
It is somewhat less clear that prison inmates such as the
plaintiff in Carlson v. Green, supra, have the same access to Congressional
attention as civil servants, or that the majority is as responsive to their
interests. See Brief for the United States 43-44 (unlike prisoners, federal
employees are not "a historically disadvantaged or vulnerable group"). In
addition, over the years Congress has been much more active in regulating
federal personnel policy than in limiting Executive discretion in the management of federal prisons.
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3.

Page

11

is

the most

troubling

page.

The

third sentence holds that this Court is the judge of the
remedy to determine its adequacy.

I

find this troubling

L..

because I do not think that Congress m~t provide remedies
for

certain

violations.

Assuming,

msut be an adequate remedy,
say that,

I

however,

that

there

find the next sentence to

in some areas, this Court can still supplement

the "adequate" legislative scheme with a damages remedy.
The

first

sentence

of

the

second

paragraph

suggests that Congress has not given the Court its answer
in this area.

I

end

the

existence

of

civil

servants.

I

turns

procedure

on
for

find this odd, since our answer in the
a

cumbersome

think

Justice

review
Stevens

avoids stating what should be the true issue here, as in
all

implied-cause-of-action

cases:

-----

what

did

Congress

intend as to the 1st A violations alleged here.

I think

that question si simply answered by pointing to the civil
service

review

this area.

system

as

preempting

judicial

action

in

In some ways, I think Justice Stevens decides

the questions he purports to leave open in n. 14 {p. 11).
And

I

do not

think

he

is

right

on

the merits of

that

question.
4.

On

p.

13,

first

full

paragraph,

Stevens posits the issue as "who decides?"

Justice

I would have

thought "Congress" would be the easy answer to that, and
the Court's task is to determine congressional intent.

I

,j •

find his stated inquiry in the last sentence of part II to
be somewhat inappropriate for the Court.

See also, pp. 21

and 23.
5.

Note footnote 28 on p. 18.

I am sure you will want to

remove the suggestion that there might be a damage action
for

removing

certain

employees

reasons.
Jim

for

national

security
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CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 19, 1983

Re:

81-469 - Bush v. Lucas

Dear John,
I

agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 19, 1983

No. 81-469

Bush v. Lucas

Dear John,
Your proposed language is fine.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

Please join me.
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CHA.MBERS OF'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 20, 1983

Re:

81-469 - Bush v. Lucas

Dear Bill:
Would it satisfy your concerns if I revised the
paragraph at the top of page 11 to read as follows:
"This much is established by our prior
cases. The federal courts' statutory
jurisdiction to decide federal questions
confers adequate power to award damages to
the victim of a constitutional violation.
When Congress provides an alternative remedy,
it may, of course, indicate its intent, by
statutory language, by clear legisla~ive
history, or perhaps even by the statutory
remedy itself, that the Court's power should
n~ed.
In fne absence of such a
congressional directive, the federal courts
must make the kind of remedial determination
that is appropriate for a common-law
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to
any special factors counselling hesitation
before authorizing a new kind of federal
litigation."
-

I

~

With respect to your concern about footnote 38 and
the runover sentence on pages 22 and 23, I would much
rather have your vote than either the footnote or the
sentence. You're dead right, of course, about Davis,
but I was struggling for ways to separate this case
from Carlson and thought the point had enough merit to
buttress the different result in the two cases.
I
wonder if it would be acceptable to you to incorporate
the sentence in the text as well as footnote 38 into
the end of footnote 37.
If you feel strongly about it

-2-

and others agree with you, I will of course eliminate
it entirely subject, of course, to any comment that may
be forthcoming from those who have already joined.
Respectfully,

~
Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.ilu.prtmt Of~ af tlft ~tb .iltatts

..ulfington. ~. Of. 2ll~'i~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

~ 1-r»-o~-h ,
fl-r_ ,£.o
1-

5~ ~f~
~ay 20, 1983

/4_~,~~~~

M.{

I

Re:

~
No.

Dear John:

Ia

"2-~)
9 d ~ /.-/"
Bush v. Lucas
~

81-469

1

~-~~
C/k- 2YzJ qL ~ 29'

I think you have done a fine job on a difficult
opinion. I do, however, have some concern with the first
paragraph on p. 11 and with the carry-over sentence on pp.
22-23.

The second sentence of the paragraph on p. 11 states
"As long as it provides a constitutionally adequate if not
identical alternative remedy, Congress may express its
intent, by statutory language or clear legislative history,
that such power should not be exercised." I have several
difficulties with this proposition. It may fairly be read
as expressing the view that if Congress does not provide a
"constitutionally adequate if not identical alternative
remedy," then it may not deny federal courts the power to
invoke a particular remedy. To my mind, this is
inconsistent with the statement in note 14, that "we need
not reach the question whether the Constitution itself
requires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the
absence of any other remedy to vindicate the underlying
right, unless there is an express textual command to the
contrary." I agree with note 14, which I take to mean that
we need not decide in this case whether the Constitution
places any requirements on the type of remedies Congress
makes available in federal court under §1331. The sentence,
quoted above, in text on p. 11 suggests that there is some
standard of "constitutional adequacy" applicable to remedies
for constitutional violations. I do not think this case
requires us to decide whether or not Congress could entirely
abrogate a personal damages action for, by way of example,
Fourth Amendment violations, and I would prefer not to
prejudge the issue, as I think the sentence as currently
phrased does.
(Indeed, although I am sure the opposite was
intended, the sentence might even be read as suggesting that

- 2 -

alternative remedies created by Congress must be "identical"
to a Bivens damage action.}

f

I also am concerned that the paragraph may create a
mistaken impression regarding the continued vitality of the
second reason, articulated in Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14
(1980}, for not implying a Bivens remedy. Carlson, of
course, said that when "Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective." Id., at 18-19. It seems to me that the
first paragraph on p. 11 shifts the focus of this prong from
what Congress thinks is "equally effective" to what the
courts think is equally effective. The draft states
"Moreover, by creating an equally effective remedy, Congress
may eliminate the need for judicial recognition of a Bivenstype action for damages." I would prefer to stay with the
notion that the primary decision as to the efficacy of an
alternative remedy should rest on Congress.
(Indeed, this
view seems far more consistent with the notion that Congress
possesses greater competence than the Court in certain
areas, which you have adopted as the theme of your opinion.}

~ My

second concern is with aspects of the carry-over

~~23, and the accompanying footnote.

First, as to the final sentence of note 38, I wonder whether
congressional inactivity in regulating an area necessarily
cuts against a Bivens remedy. In the area of national
security, for example, I would think congressional
inactivity represents its considered judgment that the
executive can do a better job than the legislative branch.
Such a position would suggest to me that the courts would do
well to follow Congress's example.
(I suppose, given the
second example in note 28, that future cases in this area
are not entirely hypothetical.}

More generally, I doubt that courts can make principled
decisions based on the degree of access of certain groups to
Congress. First, it is difficult to see any way to decide
what groups have influence and what groups do not.
Moreover, different groups have varying amounts of access to
Congress, depending largely upon the issue involved.
(The
plaintiff in Davis, for example, was a federal employee, and
perhaps a member of NOW, but the influence of these groups
was unable to provide her with any remedy.} I fear that if
we attempt to ascertain the political power of various
groups we will lead ourselves and the lower courts into a
confusing areas lacking any real guidelines. I think this

t
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would be unfortunate because the other factors you
articulate in determining whether Congress is better able to
make judgments in a particular area do, to my way of
thinking, provide useful guidance.
Sincerely',...~
y fVV

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

/lJ

lfp/ss 05/23/83
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Consider asking John to change the first

~L}

in the second paragraph on page 11 to read substantia /lt ~J
follows:
"Congress has not resolved the question presented by this case by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy. Indeed, Congress rarely is explicit with respect to
whether statutory remedies are preemptive. 14
We therefore must endeavor to ascertain the
intention of Congress, looking to the legislative history as we customarily do, and also
considering whether a damages remedy would
involve any 'special factors counseling hesitation'.
As indicated above, John, I find that both of
these considerations strongly support denial of a Bivens
action in this case.
I cannot recall a single example of Congress having declared that remedies it prescribed were exclusive.
Nor can I recall a legislative history, comparable to that
before us in this case, that demonstrates so clearly that
over several decades Congress has considered with care the
rights and remedies of the government's own employees.
is

~nreasonahle

It

to suggest either that Congress simply

overlooked the possibility of a damages remedy (Bivens has
been on the books for more than a decade) or that it intended - as the Court found in Carlson - that the legislative
remedies were merely "parallel or complementary" to those
elaborately provided.

Indeed, as I recall Harry saying at

2.

Conference, in some respects the statutory remedies are considerably more protective than any damages remedy.

After

all, they have demonstrated their effectiveness in assuring
continuity of federal employment that ends with retirement
benefits that are the envy of many in the private sector.
Given the foregoing views, I would have difficulty
in joining the final paragraph in your opinion unless you
are willing affirmatively to decide the merits of this case.
Nor do I think it is at all necessary for us to volunteer
any observation as to whether a Bivens remedy would or would
not be "good policy".

Surely, few subjects have been con-

sidered with greater care over a longer period of years than
the civil service.
I would like very much to join your opinion.

I

recognize the problems inherent in some of our past decisions that you endeavored in a scholarly to obviate.

If you

could make it clear that these problems, though requiring
discussion, are really not at all serious in light of the
long history of congressional concern for the civil service
and also in view of the "range of policy considerations"
that surely Congress already has considered.

'

'
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CHAM B ERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 23, 1983
Re:

No. 81-469

Bush v. Lucas

Dear John:
The proposal in your letter of May 20th is quite
satisfactory so far as my concerns about the paragraph
at the top of p. 11 of your present draft are concerned.
Insofar as fn. 38 and the run-over sentence on pp. 22 and 23
are concerned, your proposal is certainly acceptable; I
would prefer the course suggested in my letter to you, but
will leave it entirely to your discretion.
If you will make the proposed modification in the
paragraph at the top of p. 11, I will be happy to join.
Sincerely, ~

~
Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

,I
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 23, 1983

No. 81-469

Bush v. Lucas

Dear John,
I agree with the changes proposed in
response to Bill Rehnquist's suggestions.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
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Rehnquist
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

81-469

WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v.
WILLIAM R. LUCAS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose first Amendment
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service
Commission. 1 In May and June 1975, while some of his administrative appeals were pending, he made a number of
public statements, including two televised interviews, that
The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first reassignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful attempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30.
1
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worthless," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudulently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least
three other States. 2
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's inquiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and
that petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel action was initiated to remove petitioner from his position.
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Government, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and economy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Government service." He was also informed that his conduct had
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 · Petitioner had
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then determined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first offense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary
by approximately $9,716.
2
App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District
Court); id. , at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority).
3
!d., at f-2 to f-3, e-19, e-7.
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Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority. After a three-day public hearing, the Authority upheld some of the charges and concluded
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined
that a number of petitioner's public statements were misleading and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, petitioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discrediting the agency and its employees. Third, there was no legitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petitioner's position. 4
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, petitioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen the proceeding. The Board reexamined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities,
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it acknowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-today routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government,
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of expression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible
!d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so.
4
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space
program." Because petitioner's statements, though somewhat exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and extent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that hereceive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Petitioner received approximately$ 30,000 in back pay.
While his administrative appeal was pending, petitioner
filed an action against respondent in state court in Alabama
seeking to recover damages for defamation and violation of
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit
to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation claim could not
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), respondent was absolutely immune from liability for
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demotion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 2d 958 (1979).
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our intervening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plaintiff had no cause of action for damages under the First
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations."
647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service em6
6

I d., at f-23 to f-25.
ld. , at d-2 to d-17.
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in
this context.
We assume for purposes of decision that petitioner's First
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel
action. 7 We also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil
service remedies were not as effective as an individual damages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed.
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive
mode of redress.
Thus, we assume, a federal right has been violated and
Congress has provided a less than complete remedy for the
wrong. If we were writing on a clean slate, we might answer the question whether to supplement the statutory
Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the District Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us.
8
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Federal Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Petitioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent individually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide
for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner
7

27-29.
9

His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. !d., at
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action
brought directly under the Constitution.
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or
we might start from the premise that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not
extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by
Congress. 11 Under the former approach, petitioner would
obviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear
that he would lose.
Our prior cases, although sometimes emphasizing one approach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected
both extremes. They establish our power to grant relief
that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. We
therefore first review some of the cases establishing our
power to remedy violations of the Constitution and then consider the bearing of the existing statutory scheme on the precise issue presented by this case.
I
The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to
0
' In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit,
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld,
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." 3 Commentaries 23, 109.
11
See Bivens v. Six Unknoum Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured by
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678,
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available
judicial remedies in order te vindicate constitutional rights.
This Court has fashioned a'· wide variety of nonstatutory remedies for violations of the Constitution by federal and state
officials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution
itself supports a private cause of action for damages against
a federal official. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S.
228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).
In Bivens the plaintiff alleged that federal agents, without
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate ju12

See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64--65 (1900) (damages against state officer
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation
of Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933)
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969).
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an obstacle to the award of damages:
"That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition.
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v.
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
8--33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894);
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course,
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is . . . well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396.
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
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damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."
I d., at 397.
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan also
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in
Congress' hands. Id., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned,
the real question presented was not "whether the federal
courts have the power to afford one type of remedy as opposed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should
govern the exercise of our power." Id., at 406. In resolving that question he suggested "that the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." I d., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth
Amendment rights by federal officials.
'"""
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner,
former deputy administrative assistant to a Member of Congress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we emphasized the fact that no other alternative form of judicial relief was available. 13 Not only was the case one in which "it is
13

"Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1,

supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing.

And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief.

For

81-46~PINION

10

BUSH v. LUCAS

damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing recovery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's
position may not recover damages from those responsible for
their injury. ld., at 246-247.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim
that a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were responsible for his death because they had violated their constitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and
Davis, the Green case was one in which Congress had provided a remedy, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, against
the United States for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on
the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be defeated in two situations, but found that neither was present.
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
446 U. S., at 18-19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and
Davis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congressional determination foreclosing the damages claim and making the Federal Tort Claims Act exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19,
and n. 5. No statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy
to be a substitute for a Bivens action; indeed, the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel,
complementary causes of action." ld., at 19-20.
Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at 410
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).'' 442 U. S., at 245.
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This much is established by our prior cases. The federal
courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps
even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power
should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of
federal litigation.
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this
case, either by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he seeks or by providing him with an equally effective
substitute. 14 We must therefore consider whether a federal
employee's attempt to recover damages from his superior for
violation of his First Amendment rights involves any "special
factors counselling hesitation." When those words were
first used in Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, we illustrated our
meaning by referring to United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 (1947), and United States v. Gilman,
347 u. s. 507 (1954).
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to authorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital expenses on the Government and depriving it of his services.
Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpa14
We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for pro( \~ -..) \ )
tected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See pp. r
infran.- --\..._:_:.___:~_j
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tion of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court nevertheless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the national purse" should make the necessary determination of
federal fiscal policy. 15 The Court refused to create a damages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determining and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabilities." Id., at 314.
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover indemnity from one of its employees after having been held liable under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Government employment gives rise to policy questions of great import, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legislative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509.
The decision
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for deferring to Congressional policy determinations were even more
compelling than in Standard Oil.
"Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314-315.
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages
action. Id., at 31fh316.
16
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"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed,
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position.
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most
advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws,
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at
511-513.
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern
tbe merits of the particular remedy that was sought.
Rather, they related to the question of who should decide
whether such a remedy should be provided. We should
therefore begin by considering whether there are reasons for
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment
rights have been violated by their supervisors.
II

Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Nevertheless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy''
and the relations between the Government and its employees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may appropriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel
policy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his
First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available
to him?
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over
the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage
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system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the federal employee had no legal protection against political retaliation. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to
support a political candidate opposing the party in office
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for discharge.16 During the past century, however, the job security of federal employees has steadily increased.
In the Pendleton Act Congress created the Civil Service
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil servants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Although the statute did not address the question of removals
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service
could be required to contribute to any political fund or fired
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempting to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18
16

The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment submitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, cont,ained a vivid description
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows:
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the
business of distributing patronage among its friends .... [The President]
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what others before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand."
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882).
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2&-173 (1976).
17
See S. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826,
47th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permitting removals only for cause).
18
Section 13 provided,
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of

... ,
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Congressional attention to the problem of politicallymotivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of
Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade federal employees to communicate directly with Congress without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose."
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit political contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other government employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commission to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C.
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976).
19
In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which
provided that:
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description,
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Government establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington,
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theodore Roosevelt."
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909:
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordinate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for congressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as au-
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"gag orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several
legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act in 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided
that "no person in the classified Civil Service of the United
States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons
given in writing, . . . ." 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed
that the right of civil servants "to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member
thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the
House Report explained, this legislation was intended "to
protect employees against oppression and in the right of free
speech and the right to consult their representatives." 23 In
thorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft."
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912).
20
See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder)
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634
(remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id.,
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen.
LaFollette).
21
The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits.
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforceable. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203.
22
This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presentation to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of
persons from said service."
211
H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912).
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enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the
competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient
management of government operations did not preclude the
extension of free speech rights to government employees. 24
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the conflicting interests involved in providing job security, protecting the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and
Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Calder); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd).
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its report that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omitted entirely:
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to
Congress or MemberS thereof. But governmental employees occupy a position relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens.
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their relation to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong.
2d Sess. 21 (1912).
As Sen. Bourne explained, ''it was believed by the committee that to recognize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particular grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676 (1912).
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 10728-10733, 10792-10804, the committee
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subsequently enacted into law. Id., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555.
24
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efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional legislation, 25 various executive orders, 26 and the promulgation of
detailed regulations by the Civil Service Commission. 27 Federal civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions
forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and proceduresadministrative and judicial-by which improper action may
be redressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by federal agencies. 28 Constitu26
Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extending the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to certain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966,
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shifting adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Systems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers").
211
Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec.
Order No. 11491, § 22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commission, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel
actions other than removal and suspension without pay.
27
See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975).
28
Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example,
there are no provisions for appeal of suspensions for 14 days or less, 5
U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), suspension and removal from positions
in certain agencies in the interests of national security, 5 U. S. C.
§§ 7531, 7532 (1976), and adverse actions against probationary employees,
5 U. S. C. § 7511 (Supp. V 1981). In addition, certain actions by supervisors against federal employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches,
or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as "personnel actions"

.
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tional challenges to agency action, such as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the
Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer,
but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments
about their agencies. 29
A federal employee in the competitive service may be removed or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at
the time of petitioner's demotion in 1975, 31 which are substantially similar to those now in effect, required that an
employee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed
discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee
within the statutory scheme. We need not decide whether constitutional
damages actions based on such actions are barred.
211
Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay.
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 19S-199
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested
removal were successful. I d., at 204 n. 35.
80
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this
protection was accorded in part by statute, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (1976) (removals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees);
id. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Service Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a), 752.201 (1975) (adverse
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees,
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the
general rule, 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices." § 2302.
8
' Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at different times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218.
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then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that
formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a)
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral nonevidentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32
The regulations required that the final agency decision be
made by an official higher in rank than the official who proposed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial
reasons had been sustained. Ibid.; 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4)
(1976).
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the employee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agency's witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials, §772.307(c), 34 and then to render a written decision,
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judicially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court
of Claims. 85 In addition, the employee had the right to ask
82
Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C.
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983).
33
The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C.
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981).
80
The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972).
86
Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an adverse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310.
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period,
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803.
Congress intended that these remedies would put the employee "in the same position he would have been in had the
unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place." 86
Given the history of the development of civil service remedies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is
· quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted by
a common-law court. The question is not what remedy the
court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be
informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that
would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment rights.
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant-not only in monetary terms,
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB.
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C.
§ 1295).
36
S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
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but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who
must defend their decisions. The Government argues that
supervisory personnel are already more hesitant than they
should be in administering discipline, because the review that
ensues inevitably makes the performance of their regular duties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41.
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite probable that if management personnel face the added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. In all
events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views.
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level government employees are a valuable source of information, and
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their
( ~
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37
There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated,
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better qualified to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have
37
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Thus, we do not decide whether or not it would be good
policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages from
a supervisor who has improperly disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil,
we decline "to create a new substantive legal liability without
legislative aid and as at the common law" 332 U. S., at 302,
because we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be
served by creating it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec.
4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal employees are often the source of information about agency operations suppressed
by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual working situation than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress, spoken
to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees provide much
of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, budgets, and
overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print 1978).
See also H. R. Rep. No. 9~1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386-387 (1978); S.
Rep. No. 9~96, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
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I agree.
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May 27, 1983

81-469 - Bush v. Lucas
Dear Lewis:
This is an important case and I therefore
particularly welcome any comments or suggestions that
you think appropriate. I think there is merit to
your first suggestion and would like to accommodate
it. Because the opinion develops ~rom page 11 on,
with emphasis first on the judicial history and later
on the legislative history, I wonder if I might not
be able to take care of your concern by simply
inserting a reference to "history" (leaving out the
word "legislative"). What I suggest is making the
second sentence in the second paragraph on page 11
read this way:
"There is, however, a good deal of history that
is relevant to the question whether a federal
employee's attempt to recover damages from his
superior for violation of his First Amendment
rights involves any 'special factors counselling
hesitation.'"
I will make another language change on page 11:
delete the word "either" in the first sentence of the
second paragraph, thus avoiding the inference that
there were only two ways in which Congress could
resolve the question.
I appreciate the force in your suggestion that
perhaps we should interpret the legislative history
as going beyond merely "counselling hesitation." I
really think it better to leave the basic holding as
it is, however, because it establishes the principle
that all one needs is enough legislative history to
counsel hesitation in order to justify the refusal to
imply a remedy. If we were to go further and
interpret the legislative history as tantamount to an
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outright rejection of an implied remedy, it might
suggest that if we have nothing more than factors
counselling hesitation a remedy should be implied.
Another reason for not over-emphasizing
"legislative history" is that the history on which we
are relying in this case actually occurred long
before the Bivens case was decided and therefore is
not exactly comparable to the post-Bivens legislative
history in Carlson.
I think your comment on note 28 on page 18 is
valid. I will revise it to read:
"Not all personnel actions are covered by
this system. For example, there are no
prov1s1ons for appeal of either suspensions for
14 days or less, 5 u.s.c. §7503 (Supp. V 1981),
or adverse actions against probationary
employees, 5 U.S.C. §7511 (Supp. V 1981). In
addition, certain actions by supervisors against
federal employees, such as wiretapping,
warrantless searches, or uncompensated takings,
would not be defined as 'personnel actions'
within the statutory scheme."
These changes are, of course, subject to keeping
my court, but I can't believe that they will trouble
anyone.
Respeqtfully,

Justice Powell
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81-469 Bush v. Lucas

Dear John:
You have been receiving more than your share of
communlcations about this case, and I hesitate to a.dd to
them. You have written a strong and thoughtful opinion that
I expect to join.
The change you made in the first paragraph on page
11 in response to Bill Rehnquist, is helpful on what concerns me primarily. I agree with your sentence (p. 11):
"When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate lts intent by
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy
itself, that the Court's power should not be
exercised."
In the immediately following paragraph, however, you say
that Congress has not "indicated its intent" either by express language or by providing an equally effective substitute. You make no reference at this point to "legislative
history". Rather, you indicate that the answer here turns
on whether there are "special factors counseling
hesitation". would it not be desirable, as you do in the
preceding paragraph, to retain and rely on "legislative history" as a guide to congressional intent?
In Part II, your opinion sets forth the history
extremely well. In Carlson, as you note on p. 10, the Court
observed that the legislative history "made it crystal clear
that Congress view[ed] FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action". I think your presentation of the
far more elaborate history of the civil service system makes
it equally crystal clear that Congress intended to create an
adequate and comprehensive system of remedies.
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Your opinion relies on this history as constituting "special factors counseling hesitation". This is certainly true. But does not this history - that includes the
elaborate scheme of remedies - go beyond merely "counseling
hesitation"? I would think it dispositive as to legislative
intent, though it is not necessary to rely solely on this.
The fact of federal employment itself is also a factor counseling hesitation.
One further point: Note 28, p. 18, identifies
personnel actions not covered.
Included among
thes·e are "national security" personnel. The concluding
sentence in the note states that we nee~ not "decide whether
constitutional damages actions" would be barred if brought
by persons not covered. The sentence, though true, is not
necessary. Experience indicates that sentences like this
often invite litigation. In view of the British experience
- that I understand has been more damaging than has been
reported - it would be intolerable (for. example) for the
most sensitive intelligence operation to be embroiled for
months in complicated and public civil service procedures.
cer~ain
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Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-469

WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v.
WILLIAM R. LUCAS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service
Commission.' In May and June 1975, while some of his administrative appeals were pending, he made a number of
public statements, including two televised interviews, that
The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first reassignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of
Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful attempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30.
1
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worthless," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudulently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least
three other States. 2
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's inquiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and
that petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel action was initiated to remove petitioner from his position.
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Government, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and economy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Government service. " He was also informed that his conduct had
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 Petitioner had
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then determined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first offense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary
by approximately $9,716.
2
App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District
Court); i d., at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority).
• I d. , at f-2 to f-3 , e-19, e-7.
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Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority. After a three-day public hearing, the Authority upheld some of the charges and concluded
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined
that a number of petitioner's public statements were misleading and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, petitioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discrediting the agency and its employees. Third, there was no legitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petitioner's position. 4
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, petitioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen the proceeding. The Board reexamined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities,
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it acknowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-today routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government,
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of expression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible
'I d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so.
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space
program." Because petitioner's statements, though somewhat exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and extent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that he receive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Petitioner received approximately $30,000 in back pay.
While his administrative appeal was pending, petitioner
filed an action against respondent in state court in Alabama
seeking to recover damages for defamation and violation of
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit
to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation clai1!1 could not
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959), respondent was absolutely immune from liability for
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demotion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F . 2d 958 (1979).
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our intervening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plaintiff had no cause of action for damages under the First
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations."
647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service emI d. , at f-23 to f-25.
' Id. , at d-2 to d-17.
6
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in
this context.
We assume for purposes of decision that petitioner's First
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel
action. 7 We also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil
service remedies were not as effective as an individual damages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed.
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Congress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive
mode of redress.
Thus, we assume, a federal right has been violated and
Congress has provided a less than complete remedy for the
wrong. If we were ~iting on a clean slate, we might answer the question whether to supplement the statutory
7

Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the District Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us.
8
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Federal Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Petitioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent individually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide
for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner
27-29.
9
His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. I d., at
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action
brought directly under the Constitution.
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or
we might start from the premise that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not
extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by
Congress. 11 Under the former approach, petitioner would
obviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear
that he would lose.
Our prior cases, although sometimes emphasizing one approach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected
both extremes. They establish our power to grant relief
that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. We
"therefore first review some of the cases establishing our
power to remedy violations of the Constitution and then consider the bearing of the existing statutory scheme on the precise issue presented by this case.
I

The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to
10
In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit,
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... [l]t is a settled and
invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. " 3 Commentaries 23, 109.
11
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428
(1971) (Black, J ., dissenting).
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678,
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available
judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.
This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory remedies for violations of the Constitution by federal and state
officials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution
itself supports a private cause of action for damages against
a federal official. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S.
228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).
In Bivens the plaintiff alleged that federal agents, without
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate ju12
See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1900) (damages against state officer
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation
of Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933)
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969).
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an obstacle to the award of damages:
"That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition.
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v.
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894);
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course,
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is ... well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396.
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money

81-469--0PINION
BUSH v. LUCAS

9

damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."
Id., at 397.
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan also
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in
Congress' hands. Id., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned,
the real question presented was not "whether the federal
courts have the power to afford one type of remedy as opposed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should
govern the exercise of our power." /d., at 406. In resolving that question he suggested "that the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." I d., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth
Amendment rights by federal officials.
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner,
former deputy administrative assistant to a Member of Congress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we emphasized the fact that no other alternative form of judicial relief was available. 13 Not only was the case one in which "it is
13

"Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1,

supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing.

And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief.

For
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damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing recovery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's
position may not recover damages from those responsible for
their injury. Id., at 24&-247.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim
that a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were responsible for his death because they had violated their constitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and
Davis, the Green case was one in which Congress had provided a remedy, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, against
the United States for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on
the Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be defeated in two situations, but found that neither was present.
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
446 U. S., at 18-19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and
Davis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congressional determination foreclosing the damages claim and making the Federal Tort Claims Act exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19,
and n. 5. No statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy
to be a substitute for a Bivens action; indeed, the legislative
history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel,
complementary causes of action." Id., at 19-20.
Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at 410
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).'' 442 U. S., at 245.
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This much is established by our prior cases. The federal
courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps
even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power
should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of
federal litigation.
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this
case by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he
seeks or by providing him with an equally effective substitute.14 There is, however, a good deal of history that is relevant to the question whether a federal employee's attempt to
recover damages from his superior for violation of his First
Amendment rights involves any "special factors counselling
hesitation." When those words were first used in Bivens,
403 U. S., at 396, we illustrated our meaning by referring to
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311, 316
(1947), and United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954).
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to authorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital expenses on the Government and depriving it of his services.
Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpaWe need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for protected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See pp. 19-21, infra.
14
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tion of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court nevertheless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the national purse" should make the necessary determination of
federal fiscal policy. 16 The Court refused to create a damages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determining and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabilities." I d., at 314.
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover indemnity from one of its employees after having been held liable under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Government employment gives rise to policy questions of great import, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legislative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509. The decision
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee discipline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the federal service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for deferring to Congressional policy determinations were even more
compelling than in Standard Oil.
15
"Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into Jaw is a proper
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314-315.
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages
action. Id., at 315-316.
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"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed,
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position.
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most
advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That nmction is more appropriately for those who write the laws,
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at
511-513.

The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern
the merits of the particular remedy that was sought.
Rather, they related to the question of who should decide
whether such a remedy should be provided. We should
therefore begin by considering whether there are reasons for
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment
rights have been violated by their supervisors.
II

Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Nevertheless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy"
and the relations between the Government and its employees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may appropriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel
policy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his
First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available
to him?
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over
the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage
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system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the federal employee had no legal protection against political retaliation. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to
support a political candidate opposing the party in office
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for discharge.16 During the past century, however, the job security of federal employees has steadily increased.
In the Pendleton Act Congress created the Civil Service
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil servants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Although the statute did not address the question of removals
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service
could be required to contribute to any political fund or fired
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempting to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18
16
The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment submitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, contained a vivid description
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows:
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the
business of distributing patronage among its friends .... [The President]
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what others before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand."
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882).
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-173 (1976).
17
SeeS. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826,
47th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permitting removals only for cause).
18
Section 13 provided,
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of
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Congressional attention to the problem of politicallymotivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of
Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade federal employees to communicate directly with Congress without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose."
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit political contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other government employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commission to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C.
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976).
19
In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which
provided that:
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description,
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Government establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington,
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theodore Roosevelt."
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909:
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordinate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for congressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as au-
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"gag orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several
legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act in 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided
that "no person in the classified Civil Service of the United
States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons
given in writing, .... " 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed
that the right of civil servants "to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member
thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the
House Report explained, this legislation was intended "to
protect employees against oppression and in the right of free
speech and the right to consult their representatives." 23 In
thorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft."
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912).
20
See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder)
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634
(remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id.,
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen.
LaFollette).
21
The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits.
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforceable. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203.
22
This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presentation to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of
persons from said service."
23
H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912).
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enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the
competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient
management of government operations did not preclude the
extension of free speech rights to government employees. 24
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the conflicting interests involved in providing job security, protecting the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and
Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Calder); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd).
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its report that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omitted entirely:
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to
Congress or Members thereof. But governmental employees occupy a position relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens.
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their relation to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong.
2d Sess. 21 (1912).
As Sen. Bourne explained, "it was believed by the committee that to recognize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particular grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676 (1912).
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 1072S-10733, 10792-10804, the committee
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subsequently enacted into law. ld., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555.
24
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efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional legislation, 25 various executive orders, 26 and the promulgation of
detailed regulations by the Civil Service Commission. 'l:l Federal civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions
forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and proceduresadministrative and judicial-by which improper action may
be redressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by federal agencies. 28 Constitu25

Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extending the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to certain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966,
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shifting adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Systems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers").
26
Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec.
Order No. 11491, §22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commission, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel
actions other than removal and suspension without pay.
27
See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975).
211
Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example,
there are no provisions for appeal of either suspensions for 14 days or less,
5 U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), or adverse actions against probationary
employees, § 7511. In addition, certain actions by supervisors against federal employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches, or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as 'personnel actions' within the statutory scheme.

81-469-0PINION
BUSH v. LUCAS

19

tional challenges to agency action, such as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the
Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer,
but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments
about their agencies. 29
A federal employee in the competitive service may be removed or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at
the time of petitioner's demotion in 1975, 31 which are substantially similar to those now in effect, required that an
employee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed
discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee
then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that
29

Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay.
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 198-199
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested
removal were successful. Id., at 204 n. 35.
30
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this
protection was accorded in part by statute, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (1976) (removals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees);
id. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Service Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a), 752.201 (1975) (adverse
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees,
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the
general rule, 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices." § 2302.
31
Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at different times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218 .

..
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formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a)
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral nonevidentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32
The regulations required that the final agency decision be
made by an official higher in rank than the official who proposed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial
reasons had been sustained. Ibid. 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4)
(1976).
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the employee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agency's witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials, § 772.307(c), 34 and then to render a written decision,
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judicially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court
of Claims. 35 In addition, the employee had the right to ask
32
Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C.
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983).
33
The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C.
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981).
34
The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972).
35
Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB.
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the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an adverse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310.
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period,
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803.
Congress intended that these remedies would put the employee "in the same position he would have been in had the
unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place." 36
Given the history of the development of civil service remedies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is
quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted by
a common-law court. The question is not what remedy the
court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be
informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that
would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment rights.
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant-not only in monetary terms,
but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C.
§ 1295).
36
S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
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must defend their decisions. The Government argues that
supervisory personnel are already more hesitant than they
should be in administering discipline, because the review that
ensues inevitably makes the performance of their regular duties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41.
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite probable that if management personnel face the added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. In all
events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views.
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level government employees are a valuable source of information, and
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37
There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated,
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better qualified to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have
complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec.
37
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Thus, we do not decide whether or not it would be good
policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages from
a supervisor who has improperly disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil ,
we decline "to create a new substantive legal liability without
legislative aid and as at the common law" 332 U. S., at 302,
because we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be
served by creating it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal employees are often the source of information about agency operations suppressed
by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual working situation than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress, spoken
to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees provide much
of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, budgets, and
overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print 1978).
See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386-387 (1978); S.
Rep. No. 95-696, 95th Cong:, 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
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